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EMERGENCY AT 35’000 FT.:  
HOW COCKPIT AND CABIN CREWS LEAD EACH OTHER TO SAFETY 
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& 
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ETH Zurich 
 
Many aircraft accidents have illustrated the catastrophic consequences of ineffective leadership. 
However, the optimal form of leadership during emergencies on board is not yet fully explored, 
particularly not with regards to its influence on decision making. Several authors have studied 
decision making errors in the cockpit, but to our knowledge so far, nobody has considered the 
role of the cabin crew, who in these stressful and challenging circumstances have to closely 
collaborate with pilots despite obvious differences in their training and culture. This study 
investigates the influence of collective leadership on the quality of decision making by observing 
84 cockpit and cabin crews (N=504) live during a simulated emergency. Results indicate that 
collective leadership strongly correlates with the quality of the decision and crew performance. 
To conclude, we discuss the implications of those results for decision making in aviation and 
recommend changes in the design and content of CRM training. 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The importance of leadership in effective teamwork is 
acknowledged without controversy (see Yukl, 2006 for an 
overview) and leadership is even more relevant where 
evidently it matters most: in the face of life-threatening 
hazards and stressful situations as encountered during an 
emergency on board an aircraft (Baran & Scott, 2010; 
Yammarino, Mumford, Connelly, & Dionne, 2010).  
Recent studies have shown that collective leadership, 
defined as an ongoing reciprocal interactions process among 
all team members regardless of their formal organisational 
rank or authority has positive effects on team performance. 
Baran & Scott (2010) for instance, have concluded from 
their observations of fire fighting teams, that collective 
leadership was most effective in dynamic, stressful and 
dangerous situations because one single hierarchical leader 
could not attend to all the required leadership tasks by him- 
or herself at once. Similar conclusions were found in 
medical action and anaesthesia teams where both formally 
assigned leaders and informal leaders fulfilled leadership 
tasks and thereby increased team performance (e.g. Klein, 
Ziegert, Knight, & Xiao, 2006; Künzle, Zala-Mezö, Wacker, 
Kolbe, & Grote, 2009; Xiao, Seagull, Mackenzie, & Klein, 
2004; Yun, Faraj, & Henry, 2005).  
Decision making is described as one of the most 
important leadership tasks and decision quality is often used 
as a direct outcome measure of the leadership process 
(Vroom & Jago, 1974; Yukl, 2006).  
In the past two decades, we have learnt much about 
decision making under stress and the potential for human 
error (e.g. Klein, Orasanu, Calderwood, & Zsambok, 1993; 
Klein, 1993, 1997; Flin, Salas, Strub & Martin, 1997). 
Studies in the domain of aviation have revealed interesting 
results with regards to traps for errors in decision making 
particularly in emergency situations where pilots have to 
make vital decisions which determine the fate of everybody 
on board (e.g. Orasanu, Dismukes, & Fischer, 1993; 
Orasanu, 1994; Orasanu & Serfaty, 1996; Orasanu & 
Fischer, 1997; Orasanu & Lynne, 1998). 
In this paper we will investigate decision making during 
a simulated emergency on board and the way in which 
leadership influences the quality of the decision as well as 
the overall crew performance.  
Based on what we know about the positive effects of 
collective leadership described above, we recorded 
leadership behaviour in both formal leaders, i.e. captains 
and informal leaders, i.e. cabin crew members. 
To our knowledge cabin crew members have not yet 
been included in studies on decision making or leadership 
despite the fact that they play a crucial role in an emergency 
and have to closely collaborate with pilots taking part in the 
decision making process. Several aircraft accidents have 
tragically illustrated what can go wrong when this 
collaboration fails. For instance in 1983, 23 people on board 
Air Canada flight 797 were killed after smoke and fire in the 
cabin became uncontrollable after a tardy and ineffective 
decision making process involving both pilots and cabin 
crew members. Due to incomplete information and 
misunderstandings, pilots had underestimated the risk posed 
by the smoke in the cabin whereupon they delayed the 
decision and lost vital time. Had the captain or in fact any 
other crew member on this eventful flight fulfilled some of 
the most basic leadership tasks such as maintaining an 
overview of the situation, supervising or correcting the 
actions of the other crew members, the decision 
effectiveness and hence the overall outcome could have 
been very different (TSBC, 1983). 
For this study we have created a similar scenario in 
which cockpit and cabin crews, due to differing information 
and closed cockpit door, had to all contribute in order to 
reach the correct decision (Vroom & Jago, 1974). In that 
way we were able to observe 504 cockpit and cabin crew 
members live in a simulator with regards to their leadership 
behaviour, whereby we followed the functional team 
leadership theory (Zaccaro, Rittman, & Marks 2001) and 
classified leadership according to Yukl’s leadership 
taxonomy (2006). 
Hypotheses 
We derive our assumption from the theory described 
above and postulate the following hypotheses: 
H1: In crews with correct decision making, the overall 
crew performance is significantly higher than in crews with 
faulty decision making. 
H2: In crews with correct decision making, the overall 
amount of leadership is significantly higher than in crews 
with faulty decision making. 
H3: Only in crews with correct decision making does 
collective leadership, i.e. leadership demonstrated by formal 
leaders (captains = CMDs) as well as leadership shown by 
informal leaders (cabin crew members = CCMs) 
significantly predict crew performance. 
 
Methods 
Participants 
A total of 504 cockpit and cabin crew members (84 
crews) of a medium sized European airline voluntarily 
participated in this study, whereby participants had been 
chosen randomly depending on their flight schedule. 
Flight experience of captains varied from nine to 37 
years (M = 26.18, SD = 5.19) and from one year to a 
maximum of 31 years for first officers (M = 13.08, SD = 
6.68). Cabin crew members had between 11 months and 37 
years (M = 19.44, SD = 7.99) of professional experience. 
The age of the participants followed a normal distribution 
with an average of 50 years for captains, 39 years for first 
officers and 36 years for cabin crew members. There was a 
significant sub-group specific gender bias (cockpit crew 
100% male and cabin crew predominantly female with 79% 
against 21% male). Anonymity of all participants was 
guaranteed.  
Procedure 
The observations took place during a simulated 
emergency exercise in the A320 cabin flight simulator 
which was part of the annual safety training day at the 
respective airline. 
Each crew performed a standardized flight during which 
they had to deal with an onboard emergency of a critical 
nature while three trained observers recorded frequencies of 
various leadership behaviours as described below. 
Directly after completion of the simulated flight two 
independent subject matter experts and safety instructors 
completed a team performance evaluation form and subjects 
were asked to fill in a questionnaire to collect team process 
variables, control variables and biographical information.  
Following this all participants received a training 
oriented debriefing. 
Apparatus 
The Airbus A320 cabin flight simulator is a special form 
of high fidelity simulator equipped with a two-man cockpit 
and a fully furnished passenger cabin seating up to 20 
passengers, thus creating a realistic environment for cross-
disciplinary mixed team training.  
Using hydraulic mechanisms various airplane 
movements can be simulated and the training of emergency 
situations is enabled through different manipulations such as 
system malfunctions, alarms, smoke etc.  
To further increase face validity the cabin flight 
simulator is equipped with the original intercommunication 
system, cabin signs and emergency equipment. Realistic 
audio simulation and background noises facilitate further 
immersion into the experience. 
Scenario 
For the purpose of this study a specific 20 minutes long 
standardized scenario was created in which pilots, due to 
physical separation (closed cockpit door), had to base their 
decision making on the information they received from the 
cabin crew. The situation began with a normal course of 
flight which then developed into a critical emergency 
situation. While pilots had no indication of a problem in the 
cockpit throughout the entire exercise, smoke started to 
develop in the cabin, gradually intensifying. The scenario 
was developed by the first author together with two subject 
matter experts and validated by one training captain and 
seven safety instructors.  
Face validity of the scenario was rated as high by 86% of 
all participants, indicating that they felt the scenario was 
realistic, that they acted accordingly and that they believed 
that a real crew would act in the same way. 
Leadership 
Leadership behaviour was coded by means of a 
leadership taxonomy based on Yukl’s categorical system of 
14 managerial position duties and responsibilities (Yukl, 
2006) and recorded by means of event sampling in real time, 
using TrackVivo ©, a data sampling software (SmarTrack, 
2009). 
Observers and interrater agreement. The first author 
and three undergraduate psychology majors with current or 
past background as cockpit or cabin crew served as on-site 
observers.  
To check the accuracy of coding 10% of data (10 crews) 
were recorded on video and double coded. Cohen’s kappa 
for the different leadership codes ranged from κ = .82 
(consulting others) to κ = 1.0 (delegate sth. to sb.), 
indicating excellent interrater reliability. 
Performance measure 
Performance was assessed by two trained safety 
instructors and subject matter experts.  
For this purpose, a checklist based and time sensitive 
and weighted performance rating system was developed and 
validated using Delphi Technique (Clayton, 1997) this 
rating system was validated by 5 safety experts (experience 
> 10 years) over the course of three discussion rounds. 
Decision making 
The correctness of the decision was assessed by a safety 
instructor and subject matter expert and consisted of one 
dichotomous variable (Did the pilots reach the correct 
decision within the predefined time frame? Yes or No). If 
the correct decision was reached but the critical point in 
time had passed, the decision was rated as wrong because 
according to the given scenario, a successful landing would 
not have been possible anymore.  
Orasanu & Lynne (1998) point out that in real life 
scenarios, there is often no clear standard of “correctness” 
and that the “best” decision may not be well defined. This is 
why we chose a scenario which was very simple in this 
respect. If the information (location, colour, density, 
development, smell of smoke) was correctly passed on to 
the pilots, the correct decision could be reached by means of 
recognition-primed-decision making (RPDM) (Klein, 1993). 
All subsequent actions were fully under control of the pilots 
and could be carried out in accordance with the 
corresponding emergency procedures. If the information 
received from the cabin was incomplete however, there was 
significant potential for misunderstanding. 
 
Results 
 
First the data was tested for potential influencing factors 
such as job experience, experience in a formal leadership 
position, age and gender. None of them showed significant 
effects on the statistical models.  
All data collected from first officers was excluded from 
the analyses because interactions between cockpit and cabin 
crews took place between captains and cabin crew members 
exclusively. 
To compare the leadership and overall performance in 
crews whose decision making was correct (N=63) with the 
performance in crews whose decision making was faulty 
(N=21), we computed two independent t-tests which 
revealed the following results: 
On average, the overall performance in crews with 
correct decision making was higher (M = 4.68, SE =.14) 
than in crews with faulty decision making (M =3.71, SE = 
.37). This difference was significant t (82) = 2.88, p < .01.  
With regards to leadership we also found significant 
differences between the groups (t (82) = 2.14, p = .03) 
whereby crews who reached the correct decision 
demonstrated more leadership in total (M = 5.86, SE = .53) 
than crews who made a faulty decision (M = 4.60, SE = .28). 
For the purpose of identifying the influence of leadership 
on performance in dependency of the quality of decision 
making, we split the data by the variable ‘decision making’ 
(correct vs. faulty) and computed a hierarchical regression 
model. As demonstrated in table 1, leadership of captains, 
entered as a first factor, was a significant predictor for 
performance in crews who made the correct decision 
(SEB p = .043) but not in crews 
with faulty decision making (SEB
ns). Similarly, leadership demonstrated by cabin 
crew members, entered as a second factor, significantly 
predicted performance (SEB p = 
.009), but again only in crews who reached the correct 
decision. However, this significant second factor effect 
reduced the influence of captains’ leadership, making it 
statistically insignificant (SEB p 
= .08). Contrary to our expectation, the interaction effects 
between predictors one and two were statistically 
insignificant.
 
Table 1. 
 
Hierarchical regression model for the effect of 
leadership on crew performance in dependency of the 
quality of decision making (decision correct vs. decision 
wrong) 
 
Decision correct 
Crew performance
predictors B SEB  t Sig.
Step 1 
(Constant) 21.11 5.12 4.12 .000
Leadership CMD -1.78 0.92 -.22 -1.93 .043*
Step 2
(Constant) -2.44 10.09 -0.24 .810
Leadership CMD -1.55 0.89 -.19 -1.75 .084
Leadership CCM 4.34 1.62  .29 2.67    .009**
(Constant) -3.62 18.06 -0.20 .842
Leadership CMD -1.33 3.00 -.16 -0.44 .659
Leadership CCM 4.58 3.52 .31 1.30 .196
LS CMD * LS CCM -0.05 0.60 -.03 -.08 .937
N 84
 
Decision incorrect
Crew performance 
predictors B SEB  t Sig.
step 1 
(Constant) 11.17 14.23 0.78 .453
Leadership CMD -2.13 2.30 -.30 -0.93 .376
step 2
(Constant) -12.34 16.04 -0.77 .464
Leadership CMD -3.32 1.99 -.46 -1.66 .135
Leadership CCM 6.55 2.99 .61 2.19  .060
(Constant) 13.51 37.48 0.36 .729
Leadership CMD -7.97 6.40 -1.11 -1.25 .253
Leadership CCM .50 8.46 .05 0.06 .955
LS CMD*LS CCM 1.05 1.37 .99 0.77 .468
N 84
Note: CMD = Commander, CCM = Cabin Crew Member 
 
Discussion 
 
This study offers some new evidence to strengthen the 
notion that leadership plays a crucial role in the decision 
making process (Vroom & Jago, 1974; Yukl, 2006). Our 
results demonstrate that significantly more leadership was 
displayed during the decision making process in crews who 
reached the correct decision. Furthermore, leadership was a 
significant predictor for crew performance, but only in 
crews who had reached the appropriate decision. This effect 
was insignificant in crews with erroneous decision making. 
The more interesting result however is that not only 
formal leadership (demonstrated by captains) correlated 
strongly with performance in crews with good decision 
making, but informal leadership (demonstrated by cabin 
crew members) correlated even more strongly with crew 
performance. 
These findings contribute to the ongoing research on the 
effectiveness of collective leadership and go in line with 
what others (e.g. Baran & Scott, 2010; Klein et al., 2006; 
Künzle et al., Xiao et al., 2004) have observed in similarly 
structured teams, implicating a change in the traditional 
leadership paradigm where leadership is seen as centralized 
within one single hierarchical leader (see Yukl, 2006 for an 
overview). 
The call for proactive participation and support in the 
leadership process by informal leaders however will not be 
adequately answered if crew members lack the necessary 
knowledge, skills and attitudes. Should the active 
participation of so called ‘followers’ in the decision making 
and leadership process continue to demonstrate positive 
effects on performance, the implications for training would 
be great in that every crew member would have to be trained 
to effectively execute some of the necessary leadership 
tasks. Before that is the case though, more research on the 
subject is needed and potential negative effects (e.g. 
competing leaders creating chaos and diffusion of 
responsibility) need to be considered.  
What we suggest instead is that cockpit and cabin crews 
should each act as a system of redundancy within and 
between themselves in correspondence with the credo of 
‘Crew Resource Management’ (CRM) in that all available 
resources of the crew should be used for the purpose of a 
safe and efficient flight operation (e.g. Helmreich, et al., 
1999).  
Specifically we propose that the importance of 
leadership and decision making be addressed in CRM-
training involving both cockpit and cabin crews. All crew 
members should be given the opportunity to train the skills 
and behaviours that are needed for effective 
interdisciplinary collaboration in an emergency by having to 
interact with each other during task-oriented, practical 
training sessions using realistic scenarios. 
Limitations 
The sample was drawn from only one airline and in only 
one industry. Although this controls for the influence of 
contextual issues, it raises the issue that the results may not 
generalize to other organizational contexts. Given the 
structural similarity of teams working in other high risk 
environments such as medicine, policing or fire fighting, we 
would argue however, that these findings are transferable 
and may have important implications also for their training.  
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